

**Vortrag
von**

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**Die Europäische Herausforderung.
Vom Ende der Vorherrschaft Amerikas**

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Thank you very much for the kind introduction and also for the invitation to come to Vienna to spend an evening talking about what I think all of us would agree are quite timely and urgent issues concerning the estrangement, the political separation, that seems to be emerging and perhaps even gaining steam between the United States and Europe.

I think we would all agree that we are gathering this evening at perhaps a momentous time that historians – when they look back at this moment – will probably see as one of those historical intersections, when the nature of the international system is going through a period of important transition. Even in our own short-term perspective, just in the last few days, there were events that seemed to be quite critical in shaping the progress of the conflict in Iraq and the situation here in Europe. Obviously, the capture of Saddam Hussein to some extent strengthens President Bush's hand at home and confirms, at least in the mind of some Americans, that he was right to attack Iraq. On this side of the Atlantic, at roughly the same time, Europeans gathered at a summit and tried to reach a consensus on a constitution, but eventually went home with no agreement and will come back to the drawing board to try to create a consensus between France and Germany and those who were reluctant to change the voting system agreed upon at Nice.

From the events of this week, but also the events of the last several years, one could conclude that we are witnessing the beginning of a new American era. There are strong and reasonable reasons for seeing the emerging global landscape in those terms. Those reasons stem in part from America's immense resources – be they economic, military or technological, with the United States spending more on defence than the rest of the world combined, having an economy that is far ahead of numbers two and three, and a university system that, I think, is arguably uncontested in comparison with other countries. One comes away with the sense that American primacy is here to stay. What has ceased is the willingness to deploy those resources as America has adopted an attitude that is quite unprecedented in its history.

The United States has, from the very beginning, been ambivalent about being a great power. It has been ambivalent about getting involved and shaping the balance of power in other parts of the world. That ambivalence seems to have disappeared on September 11th, and so did the isolationist voices that were growing over the course of the 1990s and certainly when George W. Bush took office. George W. Bush comes from the heartland – the part of America where isolationism is strongest. That urge was silenced on September 11th. America's political resolve to use its resources is unmatched in America's history with the possible exception of the 1890s, when America flirted, however temporarily, with forming an Empire, picking a fight with Spain over Cuba and going on to colonize Hawaii, Guam and the Philippines. Shortly after that flirtation, the United States began to withdraw into its shell, reawakened only by the attack on Pearl Harbor. One could step back from both the events of the last four days, but also from the array of facts just presented and come away with the conclusion that we really are at the beginning of what will be a long, extended era of American primacy and hegemony.

The perspective that I want to share this evening is quite the opposite. I want to make the case that – yes – historians will look back at the events of this year and the next as an historical watershed. But when they write about this period, they will not see it as the moment at which a new conflict opened; they will judge it as a period in which America's dominance of international politics began to slip away. And I believe that there are two reasons that historians will judge this period in those terms:

The first reason has to do with developments on the other side of the Atlantic, and in particular the degree to which the United States, today, is in the midst of changes in its behavior, changes in the practice of its internationalism, so that it is compromising its most precious asset in the world – its legitimacy – the degree to which others see American power

as legitimate power, see American leadership as legitimate leadership. For the first time in American history and certainly for the first time since Pearl Harbor, American power and American legitimacy are both in question. And as a result, countries that used to follow America's lead are stepping away. Countries that used to respect American leadership are coming to resent American leadership. And that will change the world. Why? Because it means that American power and American pre-eminence, rather than serving as an ordering feature of the world, rather than creating a system which follows American leadership, will do just the opposite. We will begin to see other countries, other regions, begin to quietly balance against American power, because they no longer have the confidence that American power will be used to their benefit. To put it differently, during the last fifty years the United States did an excellent job of creating a sense that the rest of the world's democracies were stakeholders, they had a voice, they had a claim. What the United States has done in the last few years is just the opposite: create a sense among the nations of the world that they are disenfranchised. This is a development, which will lead to a loss of American influence even if American power – defined in material terms – remains pre-eminent for decades to come.

The second change that I believe is taking place – and that will also compromise America's dominance of the international system – is the emergence of a counterweight, the emergence of an entity that is beginning to have the verve, the resources, the political will, the confidence to say “no” to America. That political entity is Europe, and in my mind, that entity is not obviously a federation, not something that is taking its place alongside America as a peer, but an animal that we have not seen before in international history, something far less than a unitary federation but far more than a loose grouping of sovereign states. And as I'll share with you in a minute, I think Europe is far enough along on its path of integration, of amalgamation, that it is beginning to take its place as the second centre of power.

Or to put it differently, in recent decades, there has been one road in international politics, and that road has run through Washington. What has happened slowly, gradually but clearly, is that there is a second road emerging. It's not a good road, it's not well paved, it only has one lane, it meanders this way and that way, but it is the beginning of a second road and that road runs principally through Europe. In that sense, the consequences of America's loss of legitimacy become all the more important. That is because Europe is beginning to have sufficient weight, and if it parts company with the United States, it changes the geo-political landscape in ways that are quite consequential.

Let me spend ten or fifteen minutes on each of these two key engines of change that I see working against the durability of American hegemony. I am going to start with the European side of the equation. If you took a snapshot of the process of European integration, you would legitimately come away with the impression that, far from being a political organization with increasing collective character, Europe is a mess, because the headlines indicate as much. This week it was the failure of the talks on the constitution; a few weeks before, it was the Swedes saying “no” to the Euro, or the Poles, the Brits, the Spaniards and the Italians siding with America over Iraq and the Germans, the French and a few others going against America. Or, to take another example, Berlusconi, the President of the EU during the Italian presidency, loses respect by telling a German member of the European Parliament that he belongs in a Nazi film. So you could come away with pieces of evidence and be rather pessimistic about Europe's future.

The perspective that I'll bring to the table in thinking about Europe is one that is different. It is one that is historical and conceptual rather than one that relies upon a snapshot of where we are today, yesterday or tomorrow. It is important to put European integration in a broad family of events that other amalgamating entities went through in their time, such as the United States beginning in 1781, such as Germany beginning in 1815 or Italy during its period of national integration. If you put Europe in that family of events, I think you come away with a different assessment of where Europe is and where Europe is going.

Take the case of my own country, the United States. Many Americans and probably many Europeans take for granted that the United States is a nation with a strong federal government, a strong national character, a strong military – but that is in fact a quite recent phenomenon. If you go back and you pick up the history books and you say: “What were Americans debating for the first fifty to a hundred years of American life?” the answer is: “Should we have a single currency? Who should regulate trade between the states of the Union? Should the states give the federal government the right to raise a large army and a navy, or should the separate states of the Union preserve their right to self-defence?”

The answer for many decades was that the states would reserve the right, that the federal government would not be responsible for forming a common defence. America’s early wars were not fought by the U.S. Army, because it did not exist until the Civil War. America’s wars were instead fought by the militias of Virginia and Maryland and Tennessee, because Americans said, the states will fight the wars, not the federal government. Americans never put a singular verb after the name of their nation until the end of the 19th century. They said, the United States are, because this was a loose grouping of entities that compromised their sovereignty only as far as necessary to facilitate certain common objectives. And in a similar fashion, Americans did not think of themselves as Americans until the end of the 19th century. They thought of themselves as Virginians or citizens of Massachusetts. And when the Civil War came around and people had to decide on which side they would fight, their decision was often made not in terms of whether they were for the Union or for the Confederacy, but in terms of their loyalties to their states. When Robert E. Lee, a general in the U.S. Army, who was against the secession of the South, saw the Civil War coming, he resigned from the U.S. Army and he went back and he fought for the Confederacy, because he said: “I will fight with my countrymen.” And his countrymen were Virginians, not Americans.

It was not until the 20th century that people said, the United States *is*, that people thought of themselves as Americans first and members of their state second. It was not until the 1890s that America began to build a serious high seas fleet and commit the resources necessary to project its power outside its own neighborhood.

I digress historically simply to say that in the case of the United States – where you had a single language and a common religion – as for the most part people were coming from the British Isles – it took about 120 years for the country to begin to look anything like a federal entity. When I look at Europe and I see an entity that has been around for fifty years, and I see a single market, and I see a single currency, and I see Germany, France and Britain having decided over the weekend to begin to build a common defence, even if it is not practically that important, it is symbolically important. I don’t see a mess; I see a union that is very much on schedule, if you put it up next to these other historical cases. In that sense, I think, what we are witnessing today is in some degree the reversal of history. In the 19th century, the United States gradually came together, decade by decade, gradually had a sense of self and a GDP and geopolitical aspirations that came up gradually. Americans said to the Europeans by the 1890s: “Move over! There is a new player. Make room at the table.” And the Europeans – the British in particular – had the good sense to move over. The British stepping back and giving hegemony and the Western Atlantic to the United States, was the first instance in history when a power transition of that nature occurred peacefully.

In that sense I think what is happening today is the opposite. Europe is gradually coming together; Europe is gradually having a GDP, a single currency, a level of geopolitical ambition that is fuelling a voice that says to America: “Move over! Make room; give us a seat at the table.” Up to this point, the United States has not shown much interest and has not been as accommodating to Europe as Europeans were to America a century ago. Let me back up that interpretation of where we are with some data. First, Europe’s wealth, its collective GDP, is about equal to America’s. America’s is around \$10 trillion, Europe’s is more than \$9 trillion, with roughly equal rates of growth scheduled for next year. The Euro

has been rising steadily against the Dollar to the tune of 30%, from about 85 cents to a value today of \$1.23. What we are witnessing is the emergence of a second global reserve currency that will take its place alongside the Dollar. When you go shopping today to the east of here, the countries have already moved to the Euro, even though technically they are not in the Euro zone. Price tags in Russia's shops today are not in Dollars, they are in Euros; Iraqi oil on the international market is denominated in Euros not in Dollars, and the degree to which the Euro has gained ground against the Dollar over the last year, year and a half, is an indication of the confidence that the global financial community has in the Dollar's decline and the Euro's emergence, the Euro's rise.

For the first time since the 1930s, we have a world where there will be two dominant voices shaping the international financial system. The last time that happened, it was the Dollar and the Pound Sterling – and it was the U.S. Federal Reserve that had to run the show with the Bank of England. Now it is going to be the U.S. Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, but as we know from the 1930s, having two captains at the helm is a lot more difficult than having one. The 1930s did not provide a good historical period for the ability of America and Europe to cooperatively manage the international financial system.

A second change that is taking place is in the political narrative or the discourse through which Europeans legitimate the union to their domestic electorates. For the last fifty years or so, the dominant refrain in Europe was: "We need a union to escape the past. We need Europe to ensure that World War I and World War II will never happen again." When Helmut Kohl told Germans why they needed to give up the mark and embrace the Euro, his main argument was this: "It is a question of war and peace." You don't hear that any more. That is because the argument that we need Europe to escape the past no longer resonates with younger Europeans, many of whom are coming of age after the fall of the Berlin Wall, many of whom have no personal past from which they seek to escape. We are seeing a fundamental change in the discourse through which the union is legitimated, and now Europe is about the future and not the past.

It is about projecting the voice of Europeans on the global stage; it is about Europe emerging as a potential counter-weight to the United States. That is more political rhetoric than political reality today. But the generational shift and the change in political discourse that has come with it have become part and parcel of Europe's gradual ascent and its willingness to begin to stand up to the United States.

The third dimension is in the traditional realms of diplomacy and geopolitics, and in this dimension Europe has lagged behind. Europe is not speaking with a single voice on defence. It has made progress on moving towards an autonomous military capability. But it remains to be seen whether the institutional decisions actually lead to changes on the ground, to the end of conscription in Germany and a move towards a more capable force. We are already beginning to see a gradual shift into this more geopolitical profile, in part because of the need to do so and in part because of the desire to do so. Europe has largely replaced the United States on the main diplomatic orbit in the Balkans and is in the process of taking over from NATO the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Kosovo and the broader region – already having done so in Macedonia. My guess is that sometime by the end of next year or soon thereafter, we will have a European foreign minister, who – while not having the powers of a foreign minister of the United States or other unitary federation – will certainly increase the degree to which there is a common perspective within the European Union.

You may be thinking, "This guy is a little bit nuts, look what just happened in Iraq." Germany and France were in that corner, Poland, Italy, Spain, Britain, far in the other corner. How can we even begin to think about a common defence policy?

I would grant you that the rift over Iraq was as divisive within Europe as it was across the Atlantic. But my bet is that the rift over Iraq will in the long run strengthen Europe's move towards common defence for the following reason:

The countries that backed the United States in the war – with the exception of Britain – did so not because they believed that attacking Iraq was the right thing to do. They did so because they wanted to keep America in Europe. They did so to prevent the war over Iraq from cracking the Atlantic Alliance. I think Blair acted out of conviction, believed in the war in Iraq. My assessment of Berlusconi and Aznar and the others is that they were not pro-war, but they wanted to preserve the Atlantic Alliance. They were a bit disappointed, and that is because even before the rift over Iraq, the United States was in the process of decamping from Europe. Because the Cold War is over, Europe is peaceful and wealthy and America has nothing left to do here.

At the same time, it has increasing military responsibilities elsewhere: in Afghanistan, Iraq, in the Persian Gulf, in Northeast Asia. The sobering reality is that the United States is not going to remain a European power, that the troops that left Germany to go to Iraq to fight the war, who are still in Iraq, will soon be told they can go and they are not going to go back to Germany, they are going to go home to Kansas, and the troops that remain in Europe will be small, few in number; they will be in Poland, Bulgaria and Romania and they will be there because it is a quick jump to the Middle East, not because they have business to do in Europe. Sometime in the not too distant future, Poland is going to wake up and watch the last U.S. troops leave. When they realize that this is happening and they realize that NATO is not going to be the savior that they thought, they are going to have to opt for number two, their second choice, and that second choice is the European Union. In that sense I think the Poles have made a very bad investment in their future, because, number one, they have bet on NATO rather than on the EU. I don't think NATO is going to be around to take care of them and, number two, it has increased their skittishness about the European Union, their willingness to stand up to those powers that wanted to revise the voting system. By distancing themselves from Europe, by creating estrangement with Europe, they are in the end damaging the one institution that is the best guarantee of their security and their prosperity.

Let me now switch tracks and talk about what is going on in the United States, because it is related to the process of integration in Europe and the degree to which there is an undercurrent of – perhaps even anti-American – sentiment in Europe that is part and parcel of the estrangement that seems to be pushing America and Europe apart.

The common perception of what is happening in the United States is that George Bush came along and he took a severe turn away from the path that America had been on before, and that the true course of American foreign policy is the multilateral, liberal, internationalist course that the United States has been on, for the last fifty years. It may well be, that the last fifty years have been the exception and not the rule, and that we all need to think about American history not in terms of the last five decades and the Cold War, but in terms of 1781 till today. Because if you look at American history in that broader political and historical context, I think you will see that U.S. engagement in the world has over that broad period been characterized by two dominant trends: isolationism and unilateralism.

The isolationism came from the founding fathers and the appreciation that the United States had big oceans on either side and should, therefore, bank on that natural security.

The unilateralism also came from the founding fathers, and there were two dimensions to the unilateralism: one was a sense of American exceptionalism, the degree to which America as a unique nation will not repeat the mistakes of previous great powers. Therefore, if it engages in the world – even though it does not really want to – it will do so on its own terms,

it will recreate the world in America's image. The unilateralism also came from America's preoccupation – perhaps even obsession – with liberty and sovereignty. Go back and read Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson – they were the real populists. They were those who created the strong strain that is still very much alive in the American heartland, of don't even think about compromising American sovereignty. From 1781 until Pearl Harbor these two strains were very much in control of American foreign policy. Actually they go together; they are flip sides of the same coin. The isolationism comes from the sense of "let's not mess around in other people's hair, because they will just come around and mess around in ours," and the unilateralism coming from this hesitation to engage. Then World War II came about and Roosevelt did something that was historic: He reached out across the region from North to South, two regions of the United States that could never agree on anything. And he reached out to the Republican Party which was equal parts isolationist and unilateralist and he sold to them and to the American people a liberal brand of internationalism, he sold to them peacetime presence in Asia and Europe, he sold to them American participation in the United Nations, which passed the Senate with only two dissenting votes – a historic change in American politics.

With the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the threat that allowed Roosevelt to build that centrist bipartisan coalition, we are beginning to see America drift back to pre-Pearl Harbor strains in its political culture. This is something that started well before George Bush was elected. Keep in mind how difficult it was for Clinton to get Congress to support engagement in the Balkans. Keep in mind that Clinton, who was a very liberal, multilateral president, did not succeed in getting the Kyoto Protocol ratified and did not succeed in getting the United States to support the International Criminal Court. Clinton himself wanted to move on these things, but the American political system said, "No way."

Then George Bush came along and the trends that were beginning to gain steam in the 1990s became all the more clear. Think what the Republican Party looked like from January 2000, when Bush took office, until September 11th. There were two dominant wings of that party that were fighting it out on a daily basis. The unilateralists, lead by Paul Wolfowitz – the so-called neo-cons – would announce that the United States is going to be fully military, strive for pre-eminence forever and run the world. The other wing of the Republican Party wanted nothing to do with that agenda. They were the heartland conservatives, the people who come from Texas, Montana, the mountainous West and the agrarian South. They were behind George Bush, and George Bush talked about getting out of Europe, he talked about a humble foreign policy and he said that America should focus on its two key allies in the world – Mexico and Canada. He was orienting America back to its 19th century western hemispheric outlook. Gone from the Republican Party was the liberal internationalist sphere, the inheritance of the Roosevelt tradition that many of you Europeans are most comfortable with, people like Brent Scowcroft or Henry Kissinger or George H. W. Bush. They are the Wall Street Republicans, the internationalists, the multilateralists, but unfortunately they have no power any more. You see them on CNN; Kissinger writes for the L.A. Times once every few weeks; they no longer have any voice in the Republican Party. Indeed in the lead-up to the Iraq War, Brent Scowcroft wrote a comment where he said: "This is crazy", and he did one or two interviews on TV, where he said that this is crazy. The White House called him up and they told him to shut up, and that was the last thing we have heard from Brent Scowcroft.

In other words: they no longer have any leverage in the Republican Party. It may have been a plus that these two wings of the party shared little common ground, because they checked each other and American foreign policy in the first year of the Bush administration, when there was a bit of a mess, because the neo-conservatives and the heartland conservatives could agree on almost nothing.

Then, September 11th comes along and it knocks the wind out of the heartland conservatives, because you don't talk about bringing the boys home and focus them in

Mexico and Canada, after Al-Qaeda just brought down the World Trade Centre. Since September 11th, the neo-conservatives have been essentially unchecked in their domination of America's political landscape: unchecked by the heartland conservatives, who are in a way a much bigger wing of the party, but have been silent because of September 11th; by the centrist wing of the Republican Party, because they are few in number and were told to shut up; by the Democratic Party, which essentially closed its doors on September 11th and has not been heard of since until a few months ago – because they were afraid to take on the president and to be seen as unpatriotic. And the American people more or less went along for the ride, because they have been scared, because they have been worried about another attack, and because there was no sense that the neo-conservatives, at least in the perception of mainstream America, were taking the United States in the wrong direction.

There are many in Washington, certainly many Democrats, who believe, that this state of affairs is temporary and will be reversed. If the Democrats take back the White House, if Dean wins or Clark wins or Kerry wins, all these tendencies, this isolationism, this unilateralism will be gone – and I think that is an illusion. The trends that we are seeing are not the product of George W. Bush. I think we are seeing trends that are deeper, that are secular, and that have to do with changes in American politics. I do think that we are beginning to see America's political system come back to life. Sadly enough it is because dead Americans are coming home from Iraq. But for the first time since September 11th, Democrats are speaking up. Bush's poll numbers – as soon as the war in Iraq began to drag on – started going down. That is why Bush, three weeks ago, announced that he was expediting the schedule to give back power to the Iraqis, that he was rebuilding the Iraqi army and he wanted to start getting American troops out of Iraq by next summer. That is because he knows that, if he doesn't do that, he is not going to win the election. But even if the Democrats take back the White House, even if America's liberal political discourse comes back to life – and it is doing so as we speak – I think we need to keep in mind several deeper trends that may make this change in American internationalism more long-lasting and durable, regardless of who wins. Let me just share with you a few of the reasons I think we are seeing a more secular change in American politics.

First, the new threat of terrorism is not similar in its nature to the old threat. It doesn't provide the same leverage that Roosevelt and those who came after him had in forging that bipartisan consensus. That is because terrorism is a threat that is extraordinarily elusive, it is a threat that comes and goes. One day you think you can get it, the next day you can't. It is a threat that does more to divide the major powers of the world than to bring them together. That is because terrorism hits individual targets; those targets generally strike out on their own, as we have seen in America's response after September 11th, as we have seen the Brits deal with the terrorism of Northern Ireland or the French in Algeria or Israel in Palestine.

Secondly, there is a potential turning inward. My guess is that we have witnessed the high-water mark of America's anger and America's willingness to go out and use force to topple regimes. That high-water mark has been reached because most Americans realized that Iraq is essentially a disaster, that Bush gave four or five reasons for the war, none of which have proved to be true. The United States is up to its eyeballs in trouble, trying to pacify a country whose countrymen don't want the United States to be there. Americans, in particular the neo-cons, have begun to realize that their optimism about turning Iraq into a liberal democracy in a few years was wildly unrealistic and overly optimistic. In that sense we are beginning to hear a backlash against Bush and the return of those isolationist instincts particularly in Bush's own constituency. You are hearing it in Iraq, but I think you also are beginning to hear it elsewhere because of growing anti-American sentiment. Americans have been very supportive of their troops abroad over the last fifty years, but those troops have generally been welcomed by the countries in which they lived. Not so any more. You turn on the TV and you see Iraqis shooting at Americans, you see South Koreans protesting in the streets, saying "go home Yankee," you see the chancellor of Germany – a country which has been

one of America's closest allies for fifty years – running for re-election on a campaign that calls for standing up to Washington and winning. So Americans are beginning to say, there is something wrong about this story. We have our troops here, there and everywhere to help these countries with their security problems. Why don't they like us? And I do think they will begin to hear a call that says: "If they don't want us, what are we doing there?" And my guess is that this will reawaken the isolationist instincts that have been so powerful over the course of American history.

A third change that I think is important is that American politics is becoming more fragmented. The left is going left, the right is going right, the coasts are generally liberal and Democratic, the heartland generally conservative and Republican. That looks to me more like the 19th century United States than 20th century America. We have regions and parties that are polarized, and that makes it more difficult to build that bipartisan consensus that Roosevelt built so effectively. In part, what we are witnessing are the political and demographic effects of the rise of the digital economy. If you ask what it was that created the multi-ethnic melting pot in America, it was very much industrialization and the degree to which people from the south moved to the north because they had to go to the mine or the port or the riverhead – that is what fired the melting pot. Today people are able to live where they want to live rather than where they need to live. That is to some extent leading to more social, economic and even ethnic segregation. That ethnic segregation is particularly important, because America is becoming increasingly Hispanic. Americans of European extraction will fall below fifty percent in the next few decades; they will be replaced largely by Americans of Hispanic descent. Hispanic Americans tend to concentrate in large states, such as California and Texas and Florida, and may be revolutionizing American politics. I will just give you one quick example: As some of you may know, you win the presidency in the United States not by winning the popular vote but by winning the Electoral College. Many of you probably know that, because Gore won the popular vote and lost the Electoral College. California and Texas have 86 votes in the Electoral College. That is one third of what you need to win the White House. Two states are one third of the way to the White House. California is already past fifty percent Hispanic. Texas is moving in that direction. Florida, another very powerful state in electoral terms, is getting more and more Hispanic. What does that mean? It is very difficult to say, because Hispanics are newcomers in political terms, but to the degree that we have good public opinion data they are much less orientated towards Europe, much more orientated towards South America; they care less about defence spending in alliances and more about trade, immigration and education, as you might expect.

What that means is a country that over time becomes more inward looking and more focused on the western hemisphere, exactly as George Bush was prior to September 11th. I will try to assess how these two changes may interface with each other. There is a Europe that is growing in its collective character and at the same time becoming more estranged from the United States. And a United States that seems to be losing its interest or ability to embrace a liberal internationalism. I think these two forces are combining to create a situation in which the West – as we think of it – is potentially at risk, and that we could be witnessing an Atlantic community that comes apart. If that happens, it will be a serious setback, because Europe and the United States have carved out something historic in the last fifty years. That is a zone of peace in which the balance of power does not operate. The logic of the balance of power is already sneaking back into U.S.-European relations. I come here and I hear Europeans talking about Europe as a counterweight; in Washington, I hear Americans talking about disaggregating Europe, undermining European unity.

In other words, a more traditional 19th century balance of power politics is slowly coming back into the Atlantic relationship. If that happens, clearly we'll all be losers, because everything that has been done in the world since 1945 has to some extent relied upon the U.S.-European partnership. So I think that all of us who care about these issues have a huge amount of work to do, because, if left on the current course, I fear that Europe is going to go

that way, America is going to go this way, and we will not just be partners that have lapsed, we may in fact become competitors or even rivals.

I will end by offering a couple of pieces of advice, one for Europeans and one for Americans. To Europeans, I would say, "Deepen the union, get your act together, take the steps necessary to become a more capable and major partner of the United States." Because to some extent you are stuck in a no man's land. You are too strong and too far down the road of integration to be America's lackey, to follow America's lead. But you are not yet strong enough to chart your own course and ultimately to be a stronger partner of the United States – that I think the United States would actually seize the opportunity to work with – if that partner were there.

And when George W. Bush – and you noticed that I am not a big fan of him – says, we have a new threat out there, that is terrorism and WMD, he is right, and we can't sit around and wait for New York or Vienna or Amsterdam or London to go up in smoke. In that sense, Europeans need to be more serious about having the ability to kill people if necessary.

To Americans, I would say: "Realize how much the rest of the world is anguished about what is happening in the United States. Go back to a more liberal brand of internationalism similar to what was practiced during the last fifty years." Because I think that the magic of American leadership was that United States was number one, but the rest of the world was more or less comfortable with U.S. leadership. And as I said before, that is because the United States enjoyed a certain legitimacy, because that made others feel like stakeholders. That legitimacy, that sense of others being stakeholders, is slipping away by the day. For reasons that I have mentioned, it is going to be difficult, but I do think that it would be useful for Americans and for Europeans to reinforce that point, that the reclaiming of that centrist bipartisan, liberal internationalist ground is not only key to Europe, but it is key to America, it is key to the Atlantic Alliance. I hope, that if the Europeans do their part and Americans do theirs, that this historic partnership that has existed since World War II can be rejuvenated. If it is not, we will all pay a dear price.

Thank you.

Es gilt das gesprochene Wort.