

A European Model within a Global *Res Publica*

von
Egon Matzner / Lutz Unterseher

Der vorliegende Text beschäftigt sich mit der kritischen Schilderung und Analyse des heutigen Modells globaler US-Dominanz und der Entwicklung europäischer Alternativmodelle. Als strategisches Ziel des "US-Hegemons" wird dabei die Ausweitung des freien Handels unter marktwirtschaftlichen Demokratien nach den Regeln des "Washington Consensus" beschrieben. Diese ökonomische Globalstrategie, gestützt durch die Dominanz des US-Dollars, IWF und Weltbank sei an die Stelle der Eindämmungsstrategie gegen den Kommunismus (strategy of containment) getreten. Der oftmals gegen die Interessen der restlichen Welt und sogar der US-Bürger laufende Globalisierungsprozeß sei somit primär ein Werk der USA, der Irakkrieg als ein Beispiel für die Durchsetzung amerikanischer Marktinteressen (Marktöffnung für amerikanische Ölfirmen) anzusehen. Gegen diese radikal-liberale Form der Globalisierung brauche es ein europäisches Modell wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung und Gestaltung als ideologischen "ice-breaker". Dieses müsse neben den (privat-) wirtschaftlichen Partikularinteressen auch die gesamtgesellschaftlichen öffentlichen Interessen im Sinne des europäischen Sozialstaatsgedanken (Sozialbindung von Privateigentum, solidarische Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsmodelle, "Welfare-state") beinhalten. So sei es die politische Aufgabe Europas, der USA über eine flexible, situativ sowohl konsensual als auch auf politische Differenz ausgerichtete Politik mit der Vision einer globalen "res publica" Schranken zu setzen. So streben die Verfasser über die Instrumente einer reformierten UNO-Charta als globale Verfassung, einer globalen Geldpolitik durch einen modifizierten IWF und eine, nicht nur dem "freien Handel" sondern den Gesellschaften verpflichtete WTO die Schaffung eines Systems der globalen eigeninteressierten Kooperation an, in der jedoch „alle kooperierenden Akteure durch Anteil an den Kooperationsgewinnen belohnt werden“.

Prof. Matzner war Impulsreferent im Rahmen des vom Dr. Karl Renner-Instituts organisierten Workshops „Transatlantische Dissonanzen. Veränderungen im Verhältnis zwischen Europa und den USA“ vom Mai 2003.

Kontakt:

Akademie für Internationale Politik des Renner-Instituts

Dr. Erich Fröschl

T +43-1-804 65 01-17


froeschl@renner-institut.at

1. The model of US dominance

Recent events have highlighted the tensions within a unipolar world in which a hegemonic power attempts to impose its narrow interests and old-fashioned values on the rest of the world. The “hegemon” regards this world order as legitimate. Its hegemony rests on three pillars of dominance known as the military-technological (MiteC), the monetary-industrial (MotiC) and the ideology-media (ImeC) core areas. (This model of US dominance is presented in *Figure 1* and described in detail in Egon Matzner, *Monopolar World Order. The Socioeconomics of US Dominance*, Szombathely: Savaria University Press. Online www.ciando.de and www.fes.de/paxamericana). In all those three closely intertwined core areas the USA is by far the strongest power. Yet, although far superior in all those fields, the United States does not depend on allies when trying to project its power on a global scale. As early as in 1999 Samuel Huntington had warned that this superpower would turn into “a lonesome and hollow hegemon” as soon as its allies stopped co-operating.

What is the hegemon trying to achieve with its overwhelming military, economic and ideological resources? Its strategic aim was clearly expressed by Anthony Lake, national security adviser of George Bush senior, to be “a strategy of enlarging the free community of market democracies”. Thus, global opening of markets to commodities, services and, above all, private investment, was what replaced the old strategy of containment of communism, which had become obsolete through the implosion of the Soviet Empire. In accordance with the new global strategy, the process of globalisation can in essence be perceived as the making of global rules by the USA and by US-dominated institutions. Whether these rules are in the interest of the rest of the world, or even of the majority of US citizens, is, however, highly questionable. There are indeed clear indications that US rules of the game are often incompatible with local, national and regional preferences. Following these rules frequently means risking the impairment of institutional and biological diversity. In addition, the world economy is more or less dominated by a national currency, the US dollar, and by satellite-like institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. The global rules have a telling name, “Washington Consensus”, which circumscribes an asymmetric representation of interests and settlement of conflicts. Financial imbalances are dealt with by the asymmetric adaptation mechanism applied by the IMF. Internal and external imbalances are ironed out by means of the World Bank’s Structural Adaptation Program (SAP), which is mandatory for debtor countries in need of IMF and World Bank loans.

Fig. 1 The MOWO Net



Legend:

- MOWO the Monopolar World Order Net
- MiteC: the Military-Technology Core
- MotiC: the Monetary-Industrial Core
- ImeC: the Ideology-Media Core
- Alli(s): Alliance(s)
- PfP: Partnership for Peace: Non-Alliance

Source: Egon Matzner 2000, *Monopolar World Order. On the socioeconomics of US dominance*, Szombathely: Savaria University Press, p. 156. (Online edition: www.ciando.de, Munich, 2001)

The hegemon is pursuing its strategy in a very determined way, using all forms of influence. The US invokes the invisible hand of the market, or the visible hand of its law-givers, or the visible fist of its armed forces in cases perceived to be in the “national interest”. This has been expressed by a leading American writer and influential political adviser as follows:

“The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist – MacDonal’s cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the designer of the F-15. And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley’s technologies is called United States Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.”
(Thomas L. Friedman, 1999).

The war against Iraq is overwhelming proof that Friedman did not exaggerate. Anthony Lake’s above statement, however, needs to be elaborated in the light of recent events. The Iraq war predominantly opens up markets to American corporations and investors and also, in second place, to those of its allies. By destroying public infrastructure and private houses the US creates new market potentials. And, as a consequence, the privatisation of hitherto state-owned oil fields and companies will spread from Iraq and the “Wider Middle East” to Venezuela and Mexico. Non-allied countries, at best, will get left-overs, or will be excluded altogether. Opening of markets? For whom?

Therefore, a serious case can be made for substituting the present uni-polar world and the present form of globalisation by a multipolar world and a concomitant process of globalisation. It would be a globalisation based more on rules of partially universal and partially regional validity. The multipolar regime would allow for institutional and biological diversity. “More aims and broader goals” (Joseph Stiglitz, 1999) would be feasible. Global finance would rest on a regulated global currency, not on a national one. Symmetric adaptation would replace the asymmetric adaptation mechanism. There would be no enforced opening of markets. Markets would remain embedded in history and culture as reflected in democratically expressed political preferences.

In such a world, each region would be allowed and encouraged to contribute to global diversity through its own model. For such a development to take place, the existence of a unique European model is of pivotal significance, to serve as an “ice breaker” for all other regions. This is why, below, a first attempt at sketching a European model of foreign and security policy, of economic as well as social development, will be ventured.

2. The case of “common” values

Until recently, Europeans used to stress the common values uniting the peoples on either side of the Atlantic Ocean. This “commonness” culminated after September 11, when “everybody” declared themselves to be “American”. This community soon began to recede, without doubt because of the radical unilateralism pursued since then by the “hegemon”.

In this process, the European allies were confronted with a unilateral and massive build-up of armament, with the announcement of an “axis of evil”, and with the new National Security Strategy (NSS) postulating a US right to preventive military action, to attack “potential terrorism” as well as any state endangering US superiority. The new US Security Strategy exempts the United States from submission to international law and from recognition of the UN monopoly on deciding about legitimate use of military force.

Since then, the European awareness is slowly moving from stressing “commonness” to insisting on differences in values. The process has not yet reached the political levels, neither in the EU nor in the national political arenas. There is, however, some momentum in the private debate, which is increasingly becoming public through media action and opinion polls. I shall venture a personal contribution to this.

3. Call for a European model of development

Any attempt of drafting a European model of development would have to draw on values stressing that “the public purpose” is a necessary complement to the pursuit of private interest, as historically elaborated by Adam Smith and the classical English political economists. This is where Europe has traditionally differed from the United States. The following four characteristics have remained the essential *differencia specifica* between Europe and the USA:

- (1) In Europe, as a heritage of feudal times, the concept of private property is traditionally connected with social responsibility;
- (2) The European peoples share the idea of a social contract encompassing all citizens;
- (3) In Europe, the concept of “public sphere” is wider, in principle, than in the USA; and
- (4) Differing perception of the state: while in the neo-conservative US ideology the state figures as opponent of the ordinary citizen, in Europe the democratic state is predominantly perceived as an instrument of support for the citizens and society.

This part of our argument draws heavily upon Will Hutton's book *The World We're In*. One can fairly say that the sphere of common values appears to be shrinking rapidly these days. One year ago, Will Hutton was still able to write that Europe and the USA share the same views in such fundamental matters as recognition of representative democracy, citizens' rights and rule of law, as well as insistence on religious tolerance, or the superiority of competitive markets in providing wealth. Only one year later this has become questionable. It is difficult to reconcile the US right to preventive military action, as stipulated in its new National Security Strategy of September 2002 with the rule of international law. The war against Iraq was started without an explicit mandate by the UN Security Council. Hence it ought to be qualified as a breach of international law. The Patriot Act 2, now under deliberation in the US Congress, is also in conflict with the basic rights protecting individual citizens and inhabitants. Such a course of events underlines the urgency of defining a European model. This would also further the development of growing "unity in diversity" among the EU member countries.

4. How to deal with the hegemon

Any attempt to regain autonomy from the global rule-maker runs the risk of provoking counter-moves. As superior power has a built-in tendency for abuse, it would be a classical political task for the EU to put limits to US power. The scope of US power ought not to be exclusively self-defined. The prerogative of power should ultimately be exercised by international organisations with universal representation, i.e. by the United Nations Organisation, which therefore should be strengthened.

However, how is one to contain today's dominant global power? What can be done while global power has not yet eroded?

The model of US dominance introduced above allows the discussion of different options unbiased by previous value judgements. Basically, there would be four options for dealing with the hegemon:

1. Unambiguous support. Any unilateral decision taken by the hegemon is accepted, irrespective of whether it agrees with one's own interests and values. This avoids conflict in the short run but increases the risk of growing problems in the future.
2. Full resistance. This would invite the hegemon to quench the resisting forces. It can be very costly for the weaker side to expose itself to defeat or devastation.
3. Co-operation on the surface, combined with hidden defection whenever this is possible. Let us imagine a new member of NATO. The hegemon offers a

new air surveillance system which seems to appeal to the newcomer. The deal is not concluded on grounds of price differences. (This is a case which happened recently.) Probably, the failed negotiations between the US and Turkey on the stationing of combat forces on Turkish territory close to the Iraqi border correspond to this option, too.

4. Partial consensus – plus insistence on partial differences. This option permits observance of commonly shared values and principles, as well as maintenance of differences in other domains. It is possible to adhere to the rule of law and to differ on its implementation. It has happened that everybody agreed on fighting terrorism but that there were differences on the best way of doing this. It is conceivable to appreciate commonly the advantages of a competitive economy based on private enterprise, and yet to differ on the role of regulation in accordance with one's specific history, culture and politics.

Will Hutton (2002) presents convincing arguments for option 4 in the case of prevailing differences between the US and Europe over the issue of the private versus the public sphere. This concerns the notion of private property, which in Europe is connected with social responsibility. The idea of a social contract is common to all European peoples and states, but not in the US. The reality of a public space, which is again a common notion in Europe, exists in the US in rudimentary form only. This is why there are social and economic models of European capitalism that differ substantially from American capitalism. Global corporations pushing for the rapid implementation of the American model of globalisation are very active and they have strong support within the EU Council and Commission. Therefore an initiative for the elaboration of a European social model is becoming an urgent issue.

There is one further substantial difference between the US and the EU, which is apt to become a serious handicap in the inevitable conflicts ahead, at least for Europe. It concerns differing perceptions of sovereignty. The USA, is able to draw on the classical conception of sovereignty present both in ideology and practice. The EU, on the other hand, only disposes of a "pooled sovereignty", as lucidly discussed by Robert Keohane (2002). Pooled sovereignty is inevitable during the current phase of integration. Each EU member state must find its position reflected to some extent in the common stance. Pooled sovereignty does thus not allow rapid and radical decisions. This is a comparative disadvantage for the EU vis-à-vis the USA which will make itself felt independently of the size of EU military expenditure and capabilities. Any attempt to become equal to the US in military strength would inevitably perpetuate Europe's inferior position.

Option 4 corresponds to the vision of a multi-polar world as described in this text. It takes into account both the futility of amassing highly sophisticated but

morally and legally banned weapons and the perception of the obsolescence of classical wars between states using armies and obeying internationally accepted principles of warfare. It is worth noting that since World War II, in spite of US military superiority, the US has not won a major military conflict, and that in technical terms it is far from winning a political peace.

The strength of option 4 is of a political nature. As US hegemony rests on a network of alliances and special relationships, it cannot dominate the world by unilateralism. This was recently stressed by Joseph S. Nye Jr., a leading Harvard political scientist with inside knowledge of US defence politics. His latest book, *The Paradox of American Power*, carries the telling subtitle *Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go it Alone* (Nye, 2002). US influence can be substantially reduced if the world's key regions, above all its traditionally most important allies, i.e. Europe and particularly Great Britain, stop co-operating automatically. There are strong reasons for non-co-operation in the core areas of military affairs (MiteC). There are equally strong reasons for discontinuing automatic co-operation in the monetary-industrial field (MotiC), as was convincingly argued by Philip Arestis et al. (2000) theoretically, and by the former German chancellor, Helmut Schmidt (2000), in political terms. It is not in the interest of most of the world, including Europe and the people of the US, to be loyal to the Washington Consensus. Finally, there are vital reasons for European self-assertion against American ideological hegemony.

Option 4 is a very strong vision indeed, but in need of further elaboration.

5. Contours of a European model

5.1 Towards a Common European Foreign and Security Policy

5.1.1 Guidelines: Principles and Legitimation

The guiding principle for a common European foreign policy would have to favour multilateral decisions and actions and promote a multi-polar world. It should opt, wherever possible, for a co-operative mode of relations with its neighbours and the rest of the world, based on the principles of the UN Charter as well as on a growth-enhancing regime of monetary, fiscal and development policy. After a period of enlargement and consolidation, the EU would have to overcome its phase of restrictive club mentality and to embark on a path of generous co-operation. In important matters, a co-ordinated or unified European stance should be preferred to heterogeneity and disharmony. Deviating policies of single members would require consent by the EU Council, Commission or

Parliament in all cases where deviation causes serious negative effects on other members. This is of paramount significance in decisions concerning war and peace. Neglect of the consent principle should be sanctioned, including, *in extremis*, by expulsion.

5.1.2 *Profile: Conceptual frame and military posture*

The European Union's security policy should continue to develop its integrative approach: combining diplomatic, political, cultural, economic and – in this particular context also military – measures to foster international stability. The European Union, interested in the rule of law and in balanced multi-polar relations, would certainly not benefit from a foreign policy dominated by military options and considerations. Accordingly, Europe's military forces should not be of global reach. There may have to be exceptions from this rule - such as the sudden necessity of reacting to the imminent danger of genocide on another continent. But normally – apart from the routine commitment to world-wide disaster relief – European defence policy should concentrate its resources on the protection of its own territory and on a rather limited intervention capability dedicated to dealing with possible crises along the old continent's periphery.

The productive vision of a world characterised by a pattern of balanced multipolarity does not allow hegemonial aspirations – not even European ones. It rather suggests helping to develop and consolidate other regional security arrangements around the globe – building, for instance, on already existing structures in South-East Asia, South and West Africa, or Latin America, and by giving generous, “holistic” assistance adequate to the task of stabilising the respective situation (not spurring local arms races). In a long-term perspective this approach would contribute greatly to depriving the currently well-established military hegemon, the United States, of opportunities to intervene. This, in turn, would gradually undermine the hegemon's status as the global policeman and render the world open for more participatory international relations.

The worst thing the Europeans could do would be to compete with the United States for (near-) equality of military power. First, this would run counter to the notion that the EU is well advised to rely on a foreign policy renouncing military power as an all too easy foreign policy tool. Second, with respect to armament the United States is outspending its potential competitors in Europe by such a margin that any substantial attempt at closing the gap would involve very serious political risks. In other words, this could - finally – destroy what is left of the Welfare State, one of “Old Europe's” significant advantages over the US.

The gap in defence expenditures is extremely wide. For the fiscal year 2003 the Pentagon's military budget was originally planned to equal twice the respective

expenditures of all other NATO countries taken together. And the respective figure for all EU member states is even somewhat lower. Official long-term planning on both sides of the Atlantic, not even taking into account the sudden flash in extra spending during the war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq, makes it very likely that this difference will grow. Admittedly, this discrepancy would appear somewhat less dramatic, if one were to consider that average military manpower costs are lower in Europe than in the US. However, such a calculation is more than outweighed by the simple fact that the United States constitutes a unified (nation state) actor, and its forces are an integrated organisation, whereas neither characteristic applies to Europe.

Given Europe's constraints and special mission as a force of regional and global reconciliation, what functions should be assigned to the military element of its security policy? First, any European security regime should ensure – at the levels of institutional mechanisms and of military structures – that the likelihood of armed clashes between member states is truly minimised. Second, and of equal importance, Europe's combined military forces should specialise on defence – in order not to provoke neighbouring countries and regions. Furthermore, any military intervention on behalf of European authority would have to meet two basic criteria: not only – as already stated – legitimisation by the United Nations, but also being an active contribution to regional stability. The latter criterion rules out missions of military conquest and punishment. It rather suggests a catalogue of principal tasks as follows:

- military back-up of economic sanctions (not directed against civilian populations), of arms embargoes etc.,
- preventive, stabilising deployment of troops to a country or region under acute threat,
- evacuation of foreigners from a country torn by civil war,
- creating and defending a demilitarised zone to keep warring factions apart,
- protection of humanitarian convoys,
- defence of sanctuaries declared by the world community, and
- armed surveillance of territory to keep conflicting parties under control.

Creating an all-European force can only be achieved through gradual, step-by-step integration. For functional reasons, maritime and air elements might take the lead and merge fairly soon, whereas the ground forces – due to their respective regional and national traditions - would have to be (partially)

integrated later. Whatever course developments may take, it is an illusion to believe that hasty putting together of an integrated force would automatically induce unified decision-making at the top. In other words, political integration is a game of its own to be pursued by independent action (but benefiting from respective attempts at the military level). To make this perfectly clear: if countries participating in a European security regime reserve the right to go to war without the other member states' consent, any attempt of creating a European military force – whether integrated or not – is compromised.

Last, but not least: there remains the question of fiscal resources. The answer is that European forces geared to observing sensible restrictions of strategic reach and simply meeting the requirements arising from stability-oriented tasks could be maintained for considerably less money than what is currently spent on forces guided by problematic aspirations of power projection. A first approximation indicates that a viable military instrument at the European level, plus some military force elements remaining with the individual nations, would require defence expenditures between 1.4 and 1.8 percent of the respective GNPs. This would free substantial resources for peaceful domestic and international development – as, currently, the average military spending in the EU is almost 2 percent of GDP.

5.2 A common European economic model

As to a future European economic model, important lessons are to be learnt from the USA. First, the US has successfully embarked on an expansionary economic regime. Even if its performance has been inflated by the widespread use of creative accounting of virtual values, which collapsed together with the “New Economy”, the US is pursuing a successful macroeconomic policy. This is characteristic for the federal and local levels and rarely taken notice of by European observers. (See James Galbraith, 2003). In particular, the US has successfully established a regime of monetary and fiscal co-ordination, successful if measured in prevailing US terms. This co-ordination is embedded in the intense co-operation between the monetary authority, headed by the chairman of the FED, and the US Administration, headed by the President and his Secretaries.

For institutional and political reasons, the EU, in its turn, is still without any comparable aims and tools. This causes severe losses in terms of economic growth and unemployment. It is also a major source of political weakness. Profound change is vital. It would have to comprise: First, and above all, the installation of monetary and economic policy management equipped for coping with world economic crises, whether as a consequence of war or of recurrent financial over-expansion and collapse (Ponzi finance!). Second, establishing a new macroeconomic regime, conducive to expansion and capable of benefiting

from the productive potential of the old and new members of EU. Stabilisation criteria would have to be replaced by development criteria. (See Jörg Huffschiemied, 2003). Thus socio-economic activities with EU neighbours and the rest of the world would be stimulated. Generous co-operative relations, crucial for a Common European Foreign Policy, would be greatly encouraged.

The European economic model would have to insist on rules fostering its own strengths, which may differ from those of the US. It would have to desist from blind imitation of American rules, often enough misunderstood as “globalisation”. A particular case in point are accounting principles: While US rules stress shareholder value and, often enough, what has been called “CEO value”, the European ones tend to protect the creditors’ interests. Another case in point would be the protection of worker participation and co-management rights, and, by doing so, also “long-termism”, a comparative cultural advantage of Europe over the short-termism so characteristic for stock exchange-dominated US industry. It would be of utmost significance to analyse the most important global rules, as expressed in the “Washington Consensus” and “IMF conditionality” under the auspices of multipolarity, multilateralism, enhancement of development as compared to the priority given to monetary stability. Conflict with the USA over the rule of law would have to be extended to the adequate definition of the rules being issued by IMF, WTO; GATS, Kyoto Protocols, the UN Charter, etc.

5.3 Common European social policy

The perspective for a European social model of its own emerges from the differences between Europe and the US that with respect to the public sphere. One should also recall that there was a period in history when American and European social and economic values were much closer to each other than they are today. They are laid down in the Atlantic Charter of 1942, the political foundation for the liberation of Europe and Japan from totalitarian oppression through the three Western allies, and, not to forget, the Soviet Union and the resistance movements, particularly in former Yugoslavia . For more than three decades, US national and international policy was more or less in line with the Atlantic Charter. A rupture took place with the implementation of the neo-conservative programme initiated by President Ronald Reagan. (See Hutton 2002.) It has been radicalised after the implosion of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the US as the only superpower.

The European social model would have to be based on continued and renewed public responsibility for equal opportunities in education, health care, old age benefits and full employment in a free society.

6. An illuminating war and an inevitable conflict

War between a high-tech superpower and a declining development country is an asymmetric encounter. Rather than war, this deserves to be called slaughter or annihilation. Apart from that, the Iraq War has also enlightening effects. Three of them will be discussed.

1. The most striking feature during the months before the official start of the Iraq War was the increasing gap between pro-war governments and anti-war electorates. At the same time, one was able to observe a surprisingly large number of governments which did not give in to US pressure. It is also quite certain that weakly positioned governments – particularly among the new EU member states – opted for support of the US for fear of being sanctioned. Their move was, in a way, facilitated by the arrogance of old EU members in negotiating conditions of accession. These events can be interpreted as an example of docile behaviour toward the superpower, but also as reflecting the growing misrepresentation of the will of the electorate and thus an opportunity for potential change.
2. The political battle over a UN resolution explicitly legitimising military intervention is proof that the UN still matters. The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact that the present governments of the US and the UK tried so hard to interpret Resolution 1441 as a sufficient mandate for military action. It is also argued rightfully that any post-war reconstruction programme for Iraq will have to be based on UN support as well as co-operation. On the other hand, the UN reputation in the Islamic world, and in particular among the people of Iraq, has been badly damaged, beginning with the UN sanctions imposed since 1991. Like any sanctions regime, it hit the ordinary people hardest and produced a flourishing mafia through close co-operation by the security services, rulers and criminals, including terrorists. For the UN to engage in “nation building”, it will need to regain its credibility.
3. The pre-war tensions and conflicts between the US and major allies as well as collaborators (in the war against terrorism) prove that the US depends - to a hitherto underestimated degree - on co-operation. This is why it cannot “go it alone”, to quote Joseph Nye Jr. (2002). US dominance in MiteC, MotiC and ImeC (see above), can only be projected globally, if it is supported by a network of alliances. But, so far, neither does the US seem to be aware of its intrinsic weakness in spite a growing mass of sophisticated tools of destruction, nor does the EU or the rest of the world appear to be aware of the potential strength of their non-military means of influence. While Huntington (1999) and Nye Jr. (2002) understand this logic of the global situation, the recent works by Kagan (2002) and Kaplan (2002) are void of such an insight. Are they guilty of what William Fulbright, who wrote during

the Vietnam War, called the “arrogance of power”? Astonishingly, Emanuel Todd (2002), too, ignores this obvious weakness in his *ex ante* requiem on the declining superpower.

It should have become evident by now that conflict between the USA and the EU in the post-Iraq War era is inevitable, if Europe does not want to remain a vassal. There are good chances that the Europeans will be able to emancipate themselves from such a docile position. Already a disunited and partly resisting Europe has been able to disturb US war plans considerably. Could one imagine the impact of a resisting and united EU on the course of events? For such a vision to become reality, it is necessary to stress the values rendering Europe different from the present ideology and practice of the US. This is why work on a European development model is of utmost importance. It would have to be anchored in the better parts of European histories and cultures. And, it would have to be an essential element of a less asymmetric, more multipolar and multilaterally governed world.

7. A vision of a global *res publica*

Such a vision of a future Europe has to be an element of a broader global perspective. A more multipolar and less asymmetric world order is indeed conceivable, both as a vision of a preferable state of the world and a yardstick for analytical purposes. Its main elements could be:

- (1) A reformed UN Charter as global constitution. It would have to embody the following principles:
 - political settlement of international conflicts;
 - equitable representation on the Security Council with equal weight for the major world regions;
 - guaranteed respect for cultural and institutional diversity in addition to a respected catalogue of universal human rights;
 - guarantees for sustainable economic development and the protection of bio-diversity.
- (2) An international monetary order based on a reformed International Monetary Fund (IMF) and relying on:
 - a global currency as international means of payment instead of a national one, i.e. the US dollar;
 - a symmetric mechanism for settling balance-of-payments difficulties through which both creditors and debtors would be responsible for

the removal of imbalances, instead of the present asymmetric mechanism holding solely the debtor countries responsible.

- (3) A World Trade Organisation (WTO) that would accept cultural, institutional and biological diversity as values not to be sacrificed to “free” world trade.

The aim of such a truly new world order is to create conditions inducing a diverse world that would co-operate out of self-interest and in which gains would benefit all co-operating parties.

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